Monday, December 22, 2014

Mr.Amrit Lal Chawla vs Bsnl, Chandigarh on 20 February, 2009

Central Information Commission

Mr.Amrit Lal Chawla vs Bsnl, Chandigarh on 20 February, 2009

               Central Information Commission
                                                               CIC/AD/A/09/00153

                                                            Dated February 20, 2009

Name of the Applicant                    :   Mr.Amrit Lal Chawla

Name of the Public Authority             :   BSNL, Chandigarh

Background
1. The Applicant filed his RTI application dt.25.10.07 with the CPIO, BSNL, Chandigarh. He stated that he was posted as a Divisional Manager in the office of National Insurance Co. Ltd., Divisional Office No.4, Chowk Kesar Ganj, Ludhiana. On 26.3.07, the CBI registered a case against him vide FIR No.CRRHG2007A006 dt.26.3.07. In this connection, he wanted the details of outgoing and incoming calls on 26.3.07 with exact time of calls on mobile Nos. i) 94174 97775 ii) 94174 74999 and iii) 94178 62625 for filing the same in the Hon'ble Court of Special Judge, CBI, Patiala. The CPIO replied on 13.11.07 stating that information sought is personal information of the Third party. Moreover, the applicant has not informed the relationship with the subscriber of the above mobile Nos. and therefore information sought is denied under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. The Appellant then filed another RTI application dt.29.5.08 with the CPIO, BSNL, New Delhi with a copy to BSNL, Chandigarh. He requested for the following information:
i) Upto which period the record of mobile phones were preserved
ii) Whether Call Detail Record as well as Tower Location Record for more than one year can be retrieved from the system? If yes, what is the criteria?
iii) Who is the competent officer to pass the orders to delete the record from the system
iv) How the record is deleted from the system.
v) Whether the deleted record can be retrieved from the system.
vi) Which IT company has prepared the software for BSNL.
vii) What is the name of IT in charge posted in BSNL Head office at New Delhi. What is his qualification
viii) What is the name of IT in charge posted in the office of CGM, BSNL, Chandigarh. What is his qualification
ix) Which officer is having key/access/password to the system to maintain the record for more than one year at Chandigarh The CPIO, BSNL, Chandigarh replied on 7.8.08 providing point wise information. The Appellate Authority replied on 17.11.08 stating that CPIO, BSNL, New Delhi has provided point wise information vide letter dt.14.7.08 while enclosing a copy of the CPIO's reply. The applicant then filed another RTI application dt.23.10.08 with TRAI requesting for the following information:
i) The instructions given by TRAI to BSNL Cellular Company upto which period they are supposed to store the data of CDRs in their system.
ii) Whether Call Detail Record as well as Tower Location Record for more than one year can be given to the subscriber of the mobile on his request.
iii) The Call Detail Record and Tower Location Record for more than one year is usually given to the police authorities. Which Police Officer can request the cellular company to supply the CDRs.
iv) Can the courts can summon the CDRs for more than one year
v) Whether the record for more than year is kept in a separate device by the cellular company
vi) Whether the instructions to store the CDR data are mentioned in the Licence Agreement or separate instructions have been issued by you to the BSNL Cellular company to keep the CDRs upto a certain period. A copy of the same may be provided.
The CPIO replied on 18.11.08 stating that no instructions have been issued by TRAI with regard to point (i) and with regard to points ii, iii, iv, v & vi, license agreement is available on DoT website. The applicant then filed a second appeal dt.6.12.08 before CIC.
2. The Bench of Mrs. Annapurna Dixit, Information Commissioner, scheduled the hearing for February 20, 2009.
3. Mr. Joginder Singh, AGM(RTI), BSNL, Delhi and Mr. Anoop Prasad, AD(RTI), BSNL, Chandigarh represented the Public Authority.
4. The Applicant was present during the hearing. Decision
5. The Appellant's contention is that contradictory information has been provided to him in the order dt. 5.8.08 from Mr. A.K. Sharma, GM-cum-CPIO, Chandigarh and in the reply to the appellant from Mr. Suresh Kumar, Jt. DDG, BSNL, Main Office in Delhi regarding Call Detail Records. The Appellant drew the attention of the Commission towards the Licence Agreement of BSNL with the TRAI according to which, the licence shall be required to provide the call data records of all the specified calls handled by the system at specified periodicity , as and when required by the security agencies. It has also been mentioned in the said agreement theat commercial records with regard to the communication will be archived for at least one year. He also pointed out that as per the Data Warehouse System, "CDRs of Postpaid services are also stored in this system for applications other than billing. For example, Decision Support System(DSS), Fraud Management Service, Police verification are the few services, which may require CDR reference. The CDRs in the Data warehouse system can be directly handled for any such services, even in future, without disturbing the online activities in the B&CCS network." The Respondents submitted that the alleged contradiction can be explained on technical grounds. In the light of the aforementioned arguments, the Commission directs the CPIOs, Chandigarh & Delhi to provide clarification against each of the points in both the order and the letter mentioned above. The Commission also directs the CPIO to take recourse to Section 11(1) to invite the submissions of the subscribers to the 3 mobile numbers mentioned by the Appellant and keeping the submission in view, to take a decision about disclosure of information. All information to be provided within 15 days of the receipt of this Order.
6. The appeal is disposed off.
(Annapurna Dixit) Information Commissioner Authenticated true copy:
(K.G.Nair) Designated Officer Cc:
1. Mr.Amrit Lal Chawla 815/5 Housing Board Colony G.T.B.Nagar Jalandhar 144 003
2. The CPIO & General Manager (A) Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Punjab Telecom Circle Plot No.2, Sector-34 A Chandigarh
3. The CPIO & Jt.DDG (MIS-II) Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited A-506, Statesman House B-148, Barakhambha Road New Delhi 110 001
4. The CPIO Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Mahanagar Doorsanchar Bhawan Jawaharlal Nehru Marg Old Minto Road New Delhi 110 002
5. Officer in charge, NIC
6. Press E Group, CIC

Sunday, December 21, 2014

H.M.Singh vs Union Of India & Anr on 9 January, 1947 Bench: A.K. Patnaik, Jagdish Singh Khehar

H.M.Singh vs Union Of India & Anr on 9 January, 1947
Bench: A.K. Patnaik, Jagdish Singh Khehar
           
                                                                …REPORTABLE….

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.   192          OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2008 of 2010)


Major General H.M. Singh, VSM                            … Appellant

                                   Versus

Union of India and Anr.                                       … Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T
Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.
1. The appellant was commissioned as Second Lieutenant in the Indian Army on 15.6.1969. His initial induction was into the Armoured Corps. On 25.5.1983 the appellant changed his cadre. He permanently moved into the Defence Research and Development Organisation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the DRDO’). Having gone through decades of rigorous military service and having consistently earned onward promotions to higher ranks, as were due to him from time to time, he was granted acting rank of Major General on 1.6.2004, after he had been approved for promotion to the rank of Major General by a duly constituted Selection Board.
2. On 31.3.2005 Lieutenant General Ravinder Nath retired from service. Resultantly a vacancy in the rank of Lieutenant General became available. On 1.1.2006 the appellant claims to have become eligible for the consideration for promotion to the above vacancy. It would be relevant to mention, that at that juncture, in the cadre of Major Generals, the appellant was the senior most serving officer (as per seniority list dated 29.12.2006) eligible for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. In the Government of India gazette (published on 6.12.2007) the appellant was shown as having been promoted as substantive Major General with effect from 7.1.2004. It would also be relevant to mention, that the name of the appellant was included in the name announced by the President of India for the award of the Vishist Seva Medal on 26.1.2007. The said award was sought to be bestowed upon the appellant, for his having rendered distinguished service of an exceptional order to the nation. It is therefore, that the appellant was desirous, that his claim be considered for onward promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. At that juncture, the appellant had not only held the rank of Major General for more 18 months, he had also earned two confidential reports in the said rank. The record appended to the pleadings indicates, that he had also been granted vigilance clearance. Despite the above, the appellant was not considered eligible for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General as he had not completed two years’ service in the rank of Major General at that time.
3. Under the circumstances mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, AVM R. Yadav, an officer from the Indian Air Force was inducted into the DRDO on 29.12.2005, against the vacancy in the rank of Lieutenant General created by Lieutenant General Ravinder Nath. AVM R. Yadav retired from service with effect from 31.12.2006. As such, a vacancy in the rank of Lieutenant General became available with effect from 1.1.2007.
4. On 30.4.2007, the appellant addressed a representation to the Director General DRDO asserting, that he was eligible for promotion against the existing vacancy of Lieutenant General, as he fulfilled the laid down criteria. He expressly pointed out in his above representation, that in the event of his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General his age of retirement would stand extended. As Major General he would retire at the age of 59 years, on 29.2.2008 (as the appellant date of birth is 2.2.1949). On his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General his age of retirement would stand extended to 28.2.2009 i.e., to 60 years. The appellant therefore requested the authorities, to immediately constitute and convene a meeting of the Selection Board, for considering his claim for onward promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. For the above purpose, the appellant also met various higher authorities. On all such occasions he was informed, that the action to convene a meeting of the Selection Board was under process. In fact, in November, 2007 the appellant was assured, that the meeting of Selection Board would be held in December, 2007. He was also assured, that in the event of his being considered suitable for promotion by the Selection Board, he will actually be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, before the date of his retirement (29.2.2008) as Major General.
5. Since the date of appellant’s retirement – 29.2.2008 was fast- approaching, and because it seemed to the appellant that nothing was moving, the appellant submitted his grievance to the authorities in writing, praying for immediate action in the matter. In this behalf he also sought personal hearing, to present his case. These pleas were raised by the appellant through separate communications dated 26.12.2007 (to the SA to the Defence Minister, and to the DRDO). On 28.2.2008 he addressed a letter for the same purpose, to the Personal Secretary to the Defence Minister.
6. Two days prior to the appellant’s retirement on superannuation (29.2.2008, as Major General), on 27.2.2008 a meeting of the Selection Board for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General was convened. The Selection Board cleared the appellant for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. The Selection Board cleared only the name of the appellant for the above promotion, from out of a panel of 4 names.
7. In order to ensure that the appellant’s claim for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General is not frustrated, the President of India by an order dated 29.2.2008, was pleased to grant the appellant extension of service, for a period of three months. A relevant extract of the above order is being reproduced hereinunder:
“I am directed to convey the sanction of the President to the grant of extension in service to IC-23289 Maj Gen H.M. Singh, VSM, AC, CVRDE, Avadi a permanently seconded officer of Defence Research & Development Organisation, for a period of three months with effect from 01 Mar 2008 or till the approval of ACC, whichever is earlier.This issues with the concurrence of MOD/Fin(R&D) vide their Dy No. 582/Fin (R&D) dated 29 Feb 2008.� (emphasis is ours) A perusal of the above communication reveals, that the aforesaid extension of service was granted to the appellant, to await the approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. In this behalf it would be relevant to mention, that in the process of consideration for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, the recommendation made by the Selection Board requires the approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, before it is given effect to. It is apparent that the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, could not finalise the matter during the appellant’s extended tenure of three months. As such, for the same reasons, the President of India was pleased to grant the appellant a further extension in service (as Major General) for a period of one month i.e., up to 30.6.2008 or till the approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, whichever was earlier.
8. On 2.6.2008, the Secretariat of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training) issued a communication with the following observations:
“2. The Appointments Committee of the Cabinet has not approved the promotion of IC-23289 Maj Gen H.M. Singh, a permanently seconded officer of DRDO, to the rank of Lieutenant General.� In consonance with the order granting extension in service, the DRDO issued an order dated 3.6.2008, retiring the appellant from the rank of Major General with immediate effect. The appellant assailed the above order dated 2.6.2008 (denying the appellant promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General), and the order dated 3.6.2008 (by which the appellant was retired from service) by filing Writ Petition No. 15508 of 2008 before the High Court of Judicature at Madras (hereinafter referred to as ‘the High Court’). Convening a meeting of the Selection Board on 27.2.2008 i.e., just two days before the appellant was to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, as also, the consideration of the recommendation made by the Selection Board at the hands of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, more than three months after the date on which the appellant would retire from service, were vigorously referred to, to demonstrate the apathy at the hands of the authorities, which according to the appellant, had resulted in denial of promotion to him.
9. In response to the alleged delay in the matter of considering the appellant’s claim for promotion, it was pointed out that the DRDO had a large number of high value projects viz. design, development and production of Light Combat Aircraft, design and development of Kaveri Engine, design and development of Airborne Early Warning System and a number of projects related to upgradation of avionics and electronics warfare system, Sukhoi, MIG-27 and LCA; accordingly a decision was taken by the DRDO i.e., the appellant’s controlling authority, to earmark the vacancy of Lieutenant General (against which the appellant was claiming consideration), for an officer of equivalent rank from the Indian Air Force, who would be in a position to oversee, provide guidance and coordinate all the abovementioned highly sensitive and intricate projects. The above tentative determination for filling up the vacancy of Lieutenant General from the Indian Air Force was, however, subsequently reviewed in consultation with the Government of India. The Government of India on 14.2.2008 finally decided to fill up the vacancy of Lieutenant General by promotion of a permanently seconded service officer of the DRDO. It was therefore asserted, that non-holding of the meeting of the Selection Board, and the non-finalisation of the consideration of the appellant’s claim for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, could not be described as a deliberate and intentional attempt by the authorities to deprive the appellant of his promotional opportunity.
10. In its pleadings the Union of India adopt a clear stand, that the appellant having attained the age of superannuation on 29.2.2008, could not be promoted as Lieutenant General “while he was on extension�. It was also the contention of the Union of India, that since the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet had not approved the appellant’s promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, the same could not be challenged specially because the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet had given valid reasons to defer the recommendation of the Selection Board / Departmental Promotion Committee. The Union of India acknowledged, that the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet was the competent authority to approve the recommendation for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General (made by the Selection Board). It was admitted, that the Selection Board in its meeting held on 27.2.2008 had recommended the appellant for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. Pending approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, the appellant had crossed the age of his retirement on superannuation (in the rank of Major General, on 29.2.2008). Thereafter, the appellant was granted extension in service beyond the period of his retirement up to 30.6.2008.
11. Having considered the contentions and prayers made by the appellant, a Single Bench of the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition No. 15508 of 2008, recorded the following observations:
“40. When the petitioner’s extension of service was not on the ground of exigency, DRDO being mainly civilian, Rules do not permit promotion on extension. ACC’s action in not granting approval to the recommendation made by Selection Board is in accordance with the Rules and the same cannot be assailed. Petitioner cannot contend that he has been discriminated in not granting promotion while on extension.
41. There is no substance in the contention that the Petitioner having been extended his service, he ought to have been granted promotion. Extension of service does not give rise the legitimate expectation for promotion. The extensions in tenure were given to the petitioner to ensure that procedure relating to approval of competent authority on the recommendation of Selection Board was completed in an objective manner by following prescribed process. On culmination of process, ACC is the competent authority came to the decision not to promote the petitioner. As such there is not incoherence and arbitrariness in the decision warranting exercise of judicial review.� In the light of the above observations Writ Petition No. 15508 of 2008 was dismissed on 5.5.2009.
12. Dissatisfied with the dismissal of Writ Petition No. 15508 of 2008, the appellant filed an intra court Writ Appeal No. 779 of 2009. In the process of adjudicating upon the controversy raised in the abovementioned Writ Appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court framed two questions for its consideration. Firstly, whether the appellant Major General H.M. Singh had any fundamental right for promotion solely on the basis of the recommendation of the Selection Board. And secondly, whether Appointments Committee of the Cabinet was liable to accept the recommendation made by the Selection Board in favour of the appellant, and consequently, order the appellant’s promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. Relying on paragraph 108 of the Regulation of Army which delineates the constitution and duties of the Selection Board, the Division Bench concluded that the recommendations of the Selection Board were merely recommendatory in nature, and therefore, answered the first question in the negative. The Division Bench further held, that a legitimate claim for the promotion would arise, only if a recommendation made by the Selection Board gets the approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. Relying on the judgments rendered by this Court in Dr. H. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India and others, 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 250, Union of India and others Vs. N.P. Dhamania and others, 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 1, and Food Corporation of India and others Vs. Parashotam Das Bansal and others, (2008) 5 SCC 100, the Division Bench of the High Court further concluded, that the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet was not bound by the recommendation of the Selection Board. It accordingly held, that for justifiable reasons, the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet had the right to either accept, or to refuse the recommendation of the Selection Board. In sum and substance it came to be concluded, that unless it was shown that the determination of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet suffered from arbitrariness or malafides and capriciousness, the same could not be interfered with. The Division Bench of the High Court having found none of the above noted vices in the determination of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, answered the second question also in the negative.
13. Based on its aforementioned determination, the High Court dismissed Writ Appeal No. 779 of 2009, on 21.7.2009. Dissatisfied with the order dated 5.5.2009 (passed by the Single Judge of the High Court, dismissing Writ Petition No. 15508 of 2009), and the order dated 21.7.2009 (passed by the Division Bench of the High Court dismissing Writ Appeal No. 779 of 2009), the appellant approached this Court by filing Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 2008 of 2010. On 11.1.2010 this Court issued notice in this matter. On completion of pleadings the matter was listed for final disposal.
14. Leave granted.
15. On 29.8.2013 while hearing the matter this Court passed the following order:
“Before we proceed for further hearing in the matter, we would like to go through the deliberations of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet [for short ‘the ACC’] by which the recommendations of the Selection Board was not accepted in the case of the petitioner.
Hence the records of the Selection Board and the final orders passed therein in the case of the petitioner be placed before the Court on the next date of hearing, i.e., 10th September, 2013.� Thereafter on 12.9.2013 this Court passed the following order:
“We have perused the record produced before us and we have also heard the arguments of learned Additional Solicitor General� Ld. A.S.G. has sought time to seek instructions.
On the next date, Ld. A.S.G. will ensure that a copy of the note put up to the A.C.C. and the decision of A.C.C. as well as a copy of the recommendation dated 27th February, 2008 of the Selection Board are made available to the Court List this matter on 23rd September, 2013.� The summoning of the record referred to in the orders extracted hereinabove, had become essential for two reasons. Firstly, the appellant did not contest the findings recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court on the two questions framed by the High Court, for the disposal of Writ Appeal No. 779 of 2009. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the determination rendered by the High Court, on the two questions framed by it, we must acknowledge that the High Court was fully justified in drawing its conclusions. We therefore hereby affirm the above findings recorded by the High Court. According to the appellant, the High Court had misdirected itself in its above determination. It was the submission of the appellant, that the determination of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, was not supported by justifiable reasons. It was asserted, that the determination of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet was arbitrary, and based on extraneous consideration. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it was the vehement submission of the appellant, that the High Court had not addressed the issue at all.
16. The solitary contention advanced at the hands of the appellant, was based on the recommendation made by the Selection Board on 27.2.2008, and the consideration of the above recommendation by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (leading to the rejection of the appellant’s claim for the promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General). For effectively understanding and determining the solitary contention at the hands of the appellant, it is essential to extract the minutes of the meeting of the Selection Board dated 27.2.2008, as also, the proceedings of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. Without understanding the tenor and effect of the above deliberations, it would not be possible to express our findings and the reasons. Had the above proceedings revealed sensitive material, improper for public consumption, or detrimental to national interest, we would have chosen to tread cautiously. The deliberations which resulted in denial of promotion to the appellant (to the rank of Lieutenant General), however, have no such misgivings. We have therefore no hesitation in extracting the minutes of the meeting of the Selection Board dated 27.2.2008. The same are being reproduced hereinunder:-
“MINUTES OF (1/2008) DRDO SELECTION BOARD MEETING HELD ON 27 FEB 2008 The Selection Board comprising the following, met on 27 Feb 08 in the office of the Scientific Advisor to Raksha Mantri, Room No. 532, DRDO Bhawan, New Delhi:-
           (a)   Shri M. Natarajan, SA to RM           - Chairman
           (b)   Shri Pradeep Kumar, Secretary (DP) - Member
           (c)   Lt. Gen. M.L. Naidu,
                 PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VCOAS     - Member
           (d)   Dr. D. Banerjee,
                 DS &  CC  R&D  (AMS)                     -  Member
           Secretary


2. Defence Secretary did not attend the meeting due to other prior commitments.
3. SA to RM briefed the Board to say that only one vacancy in the rank of Lt. Gen exists. The other vacancy in lieu of Scientist ‘H’ has been referred back to the RM for reconsideration and therefore will be considered only after a decision.
4. The Board considered the following 04 officers for promotion to the acting rank of Lt. Gen:-
           |Ser No. |IC No., Rank, Name & Corps                        |
|(i)     |MR-03539 Maj Gen J.K. Bansal, AMC                 |
|(ii)    |IC-23289 Maj Gen H.M. Singh, VSM, AC              |
|(iii)   |IC-23850 Maj Gen S.S. Dahiya, AVSM, VSM EME       |
|(iv)    |IC-24631 Maj Gen Umang Kapoor, EME                |


5. Based on deliberations and record of service, past performance, qualities of leadership as well as vision, the Board recommends IC-23289 Maj Gen HM Singh, VSM, AC for promotion.
           Sd/-                                         Sd/-
           DS&CC R&D (AMS)                         VCOAS
           Member Secretary                        Member�

                                                          (emphasis is ours)


The proceedings recorded by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet while rejecting the appellant’s claim for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General are also being set out below:-
“The Ministry of Defence has, with the approval of the Raksha Mantri proposed the promotion of IC-23289 Maj Gen HM Singh, a permanently seconded officer of the DRDO, to the rank of Lieutenant General.
2. Maj Gen HM Singh (dob: 02.02.1949) was due for superannuation on 29th February, 2008 on attaining the age of 59 years which is the age of superannuation for officers of the rank of Major Generals who are permanently seconded to the DRDO. A Selection Board which met on 27th February, 2008 to consider eligible officers of the rank of Major General permanently seconded to the DRDO for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, recommended Major General Singh for promotion. As the officer was due for retirement on 29th February, 2008 approval of the Raksha Mantri was obtained for giving him extension of service of three months in the rank of Major General or till the approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet to his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, whichever is earlier. Officers in the rank of Lieutenant General retire on attaining the age of 60 years.
3. The propriety of grant of extension to the officer at the verge of his superannuation and also, that of grant of promotion to the officer while on extension has been examined. The matter has been discussed, separately, with officers from the Department of Personnel and Training; the DRDO, and also, the Ministry of Defence (Military Secretary’s Branch). This apart, a legal notice has been received alleging perjury on the basis of information secured from the Ministry of Defence under the Right to Information Act. A representation has also been received from an officer, Maj Gen PP Das, alleging discrimination.
4. In terms of the provisions of Section 16A(4) of the Army Act an officer who has attained the age of retirement or has become due for such retirement on completion of his tenure, may be retained in the service for a further period by the Central Government, if the exigencies of the service so require.
5. It is evident from the above provisions that for grant of extension in service, the requirement to be fulfilled, primarily, is the exigencies of service. In the note which was put up to the Raksha Mantri soliciting approval to the proposal for grant of extension, no such exigency has been cited. The only issue that was mentioned in support of the proposal for extension was that the officer had been recommended for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. This in the background of the provisions of the Act mentioned above, is no sufficient ground for extension.
6. The Chief Controller Research & Development with whom the matter was discussed has provided copies of orders issued in the years 1995 and 1996 when officers of the rank of Major General were granted extensions. Extensions in service were granted with the approval of the Integrated Finance Division in the Ministry of Defence though approval of the finance angle is not strictly relevant to the grant of extensions. The other two instances cited are of Shri P. Venugopalan, Outstanding Scientist in the DRDL, Hyderabad who was granted extension pending a decision on the question of his regular extension under FR.56 as a Scientist; and of the post retirement appointment of Vice Admiral PC Bhasin on contract basis in the ATVP. These two cases are not relevant to the case of Maj Gen Singh, present under consideration.
7. An instance has been cited, during discussions, of extension of service granted in the year 1997 or thereabouts to Major General Malik who was due for superannuation, and his promotion to the rank of Lt. Gen while on extension.
8. The orders issued by the Department of Personnel and Training lay down that while extension could be granted in exceptional circumstances, there can be no promotion during the period of such extension. These orders apply to the civilian establishment. The instructions which apply to the Defence forces permit extension in service only if the exigencies so demand. DRDO is mainly civilian, and the Rules, as mentioned above, do not permit promotion on extension.
9. The above apart, the plea taken the representation of Maj Gen P.P. Das, and also the legal notice needs to be kept in view. Instances of officers in the Armed Forces retiring just before the vacancies coming their way and being denied empanelment are not uncommon. Extensions motivated by reasons of promotion being close at hand can have repercussions.
10. The above part, the ACR format which is followed for the officers of this rank, seconded to the DRDO, which has been applied for recording of ACRs in the present case reveal that fitness for promotion should be specifically recorded in the ACr. A perusal of the ACR of Maj Gen Singh reveals that specific record of fitness for promotion has not been made.
11. More pointedly, two questions stand out, firstly, the doubtful authority and grounds for granting extensions, taking into account that there was no exigency and, secondly, extensions, motivated by a promotion in the offing during the extension period cannot be allowed. It cannot be ignored also that such situations trigger litigation, which should best be avoided in such instances.
12. Under the above circumstances, it would be appropriate not to approve the promotion of Maj Gen H.M. Singh to the rank of Lieutenant General.
Sd/-
                                                           Cabinet Secretary
                                                                   22.5.2008


           HOME MINISTER    Sd/-
                                  28.5.2008


PRIME MINISTER has approved Para 12 above with the direction that the observation in Paras 5 and 8 may be communicated to the MOD for the future.
Sd/-
                                                   30.5.2008
           Sd/-                                    Director
           Cabinet Secretary                       Prime Minister’s Office
           2.6.2008                                New Delhi�


                                                          (emphasis is ours)




17. The appellant points out, that the determination of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, overlooked the factual position stated in the counter affidavit, filed jointly on behalf of respondent nos. 1 and 2 (respondent no.1 – the Union of India, through Secretariat of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet; and respondent no. 2 – the DRDO through its Director General). In this behalf our attention was drawn to paragraphs 3 (xvii) and 3 (xviii) which are being extracted below:
“3 (xvii) A meeting of the Selection Board was held on 27.2.2008 and the Selection Board recommended the name of the petitioner for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. The post of Lieutenant General then carried the pay scale of Rs.22400-525- 24500. Any appointment against this post requires the approval of Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) (Respondent No.1), which is a high power body consisting of the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India, Hon’ble Union Home Minister, Hon’ble Union Minister of Department of Personnel and Hon’ble Union Defence Minister. As such, the recommendation of the Selection Board were sent to ACC. In DRDO, the retirement age of an officer of the rank of Maj Gen/equivalent which the petitioner held at that time is 59 years. The petitioner was due to retire from service w.e.f 29.2.2008. Under these circumstances, he was given an extension of service for a period of three months or till the decision of ACC was received whichever was earlier. As the decision of ACC was not received till 31.5.2008, his service was extended further for a period of one month w.e.f 1.6.2008 on the same terms and conditions.
3 (xviii) The decision of ACC (Respondent No.1) regarding non-
approval of promotion of the petitioner to the rank of Lieutenant General communicated vide letter dated 2.6.2008 was received by respondent no. 2 on 3.6.2008 and the latter had to issue orders of the petitioner’s retirement from service from 3.6.2008.� (emphasis is ours)
18. Referring to the factual position depicted in the joint counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 1 and 2, it was the vehement submission of the appellant, that the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet exceeded its jurisdiction in examining the validity of the orders by which the appellant was granted extension in service. It was the submission of the appellant, that the only question before the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, consequent upon the recommendations made by the Selection Board on 27.2.2008, was in connection with the merits of the claim of the appellant, for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General.
Adding to the above contention, it was also the submission of the appellant, that the Selection Board, consequent upon its deliberations held on 27.2.2008, arrived at its findings based on the appellant’s service record, past performance, qualities of leadership, as well as, vision, that the appellant was worthy of promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. The Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, during the course of its deliberations, did not find fault with the above conclusion drawn by the Selection Board. As such, it was sought to be asserted, that even the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet must be deemed to have endorsed the merit and suitability of the appellant, for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General.
19. In order to contest the submissions advanced at the hands of the appellant, learned senior counsel representing (respondent nos. 1 and 2) emphatically relied upon the proceedings of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. The proceedings under reference have been extracted by us hereinabove. Referring to the above proceedings, learned senior counsel for the respondents laid great emphasis on the observations recorded in paragraphs 8 and 9 thereof. It was pointed out, that in terms of the orders issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, promotion during the period of extension was unquestionably barred. In this behalf it was the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondents, that with effect from 1.3.2008, the appellant (who had attained the age of retirement on superannuation on 29.2.2008), was on extension in service. There was, therefore, no question of his being considered for promotion during the period of such extension. In addition to the aforesaid categoric stand adopted by the learned senior counsel for the respondents, it was sought to be reiterated, that the orders dated 29.2.2008 and 30.5.2008, by which the appellant was granted extension in service, for periods of three months and one month respectively, were not sustainable in law, inasmuch as, they were in violation of Rule 16A of the Army Rules which postulates, that an officers who has attained the age of retirement or has become due for such retirement on completion of his tenure, may be retained in service for a further period by the Central Government, only if the exigencies of service so require. It was the submission of learned senior counsel for the respondents, that retention in service of the appellant was not on account of any exigency of service.
20. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the rival parties. First and foremost, we have no hesitation in endorsing the submission advanced at the hands of the appellant, that the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet did not in any manner upset the finding recorded by the Selection Board, in respect of the merit and suitability of the appellant for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. On the instant aspect of the matter, the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet has maintained a sullen silence. Even in the pleadings filed on behalf of the respondents, there is an ironic quiescence. Therefore, all other issues apart, the appellant must be deemed to have been found suitable for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, even by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet.
21. We have extracted hereinabove the factual position noticed by the respondents in paragraphs 3(xvii) and 3(xviii) of their counter affidavit. If the aforesaid averments are read in conjunction to the factual position, that the vacancy against which the claim of the appellant was considered, had arisen on 1.1.2007, it clearly emerges, that the appellant was the senior most eligible officer holding the rank of Major General whose name fell in the zone of consideration for promotion. The Selection Board having conducted its deliberations singularly chose the name of the appellant from the panel of four names before it. The proceedings of the Selection Board reveal, that its recommendations were based on record of service, past performance, qualities of leadership, as well as, vision. No other name besides the appellant’s name was recommended for promotion. Having been so recommended, the President of India, in the first instance, by an order dated 29.2.2008, extended the service of the appellant, for the period of three months with effect from 1.3.2008 “or till the approval of the ACC whichever is earlier�. Since the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet did not render its determination within the extended period expressed in the order dated 29.2.2008, yet another order to the same effect was issued by the President of India on 30.5.2008 extending the service of the appellant for a further period of one month with effect from 1.6.2008 “or till the approval of the ACC whichever is earlier�. The President of India, therefore, was conscious of the fact while granting extension in service to the appellant, the appellant’s case for onward promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General was under consideration. Therefore, to ensure that the aforesaid consideration fructified into a result one way or the other, extensions were granted to the appellant twice over. The aforesaid determination at the hands of the President of India in granting extension in service to the appellant, stands noticed in the factual position expressed in paragraphs 3(xvii) and 3(xviii) of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2. It is not possible for us to accept, that the aforesaid determination in allowing extension in service to the appellant can be described as being in violation of the norms stipulated in Rule 16A of the Army Rules. It is necessary in this behalf, for us to test the above conclusion drawn by us, on the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is not a matter of dispute, that the appellant was promoted to the rank of substantive Major General with effect from 7.1.2004. It is also not a matter of dispute, that the substantive vacancy in the rank of Lieutenant General, against which the appellant was eligible for consideration, became available with effect from 1.1.2007. Even though the appellant had nearly 14 months of military service remaining at the aforesaid juncture, the procedure contemplated for making promotions to the rank of the Lieutenant General was initiated for the first time just two days before the date of retirement of the appellant, on 27.2.2008. Although it is the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondents, that the delay in convening the Selection Board and conducting its proceedings was not deliberate or malafide, yet there can be no doubt about the fact, that the appellant was not responsible for such delay. For all intents and purposes, he was repeatedly seeking consideration orally as well as in writing. He had been repeatedly informing the authorities about the approaching date of his retirement. In response, he was always assured, that if found suitable, he would be actually promoted prior to the date of his retirement. It was for the respondents to convene the meeting of the Selection Board. Since the Selection Board came to be convened for the vacancy which had arisen on 1.1.2007 only on 27.2.2008, the respondents must squarely shoulder the blame and responsibility of the above delay.
22. The question that arises for consideration is, whether the non- consideration of the claim of the appellant would violate the fundamental rights vested in him under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The answer to the aforesaid query would be in the affirmative, subject to the condition, that the respondents were desirous of filling the vacancy of Lieutenant General, when it became available on 1.1.2007. The factual position depicted in the counter affidavit reveals, that the respondents indeed were desirous of filling up the said vacancy. In the above view of the matter, if the appellant was the senior most serving Major General eligible for consideration (which he undoubtedly was), he most definitely had the fundamental right of being considered against the above vacancy, and also the fundamental right of being promoted if he was adjudged suitable. Failing which, he would be deprived of his fundamental right of equality before the law, and equal protection of the laws, extended by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We are of the view, that it was in order to extend the benefit of the fundamental right enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, that he was allowed extension in service on two occasions, firstly by the Presidential order dated 29.2.2008, and thereafter, by a further Presidential order dated 30.5.2008. The above orders clearly depict, that the aforesaid extension in service was granted to the appellant for a period of three months (and for a further period of one month), or till the approval of the ACC, whichever is earlier. By the aforesaid orders, the respondents desired to treat the appellant justly, so as to enable him to acquire the honour of promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, (in case the recommendation made in his favour by the Selection Board was approved by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet), stands affirmed. The action of the authorities in depriving the appellant due consideration for promotion to the rank of the Lieutenant General, would have resulted in violation of his fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Such an action at the hands of the respondents would unquestionably have been arbitrary. We are therefore of the view, firstly, that the order allowing extension in service of the appellant for a period of three months, dated 29.2.2008, and the order allowing further extension in service by one month to the appellant, dated 30.5.2008, so as to enable his claim to be considered for onward promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, cannot be held to be in violation of the statutory provisions. Rule 16A of the Army Rules, postulates extension in service, if the exigencies of service so require. The said parameter must have been duly taken into consideration when the Presidential Orders dated 29.2.2008 and 30.5.2008 were passed. The respondents have neither revoked, nor sought revocation of the above orders. Therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondents to question the veracity of the above orders. The above orders were passed to ensure due consideration of the appellant’s claim for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. Without rejecting the above claim on merits, the appellant was deprived of promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. Besides the above, we are also of the considered view, that consideration of the promotional claim of the senior most eligible officer, would also fall in the parameters of the rule providing for extension, if the exigencies of service so require. It would be a sad day if the armed forces decline to give effect to the legitimate expectations of the highest ranked armed forces personnel. Specially when, blame for delay in such consideration, rests squarely on the shoulders of the authorities themselves. This would lead to individual resentment, bitterness, displeasure and indignation. This could also undoubtedly lead to, outrage at the highest level of the armed forces. Surely, extension of service, for the purpose granted to the appellant, would most definitely fall within the realm of Rule 16A of the Army Rules, unless of course, individual resentment, bitterness, displeasure and indignation, of army personnel at the highest level is of no concern to the authorities. Or alternatively, the authorities would like to risk outrage at the highest level, rather than doing justice to a deserving officer. Reliance on Rule 16A, to deprive the appellant of promotion, to our mind, is just a lame excuse. Accordingly, extension in service granted to the appellant, for all intents and purposes, in our considered view, will be deemed to satisfy the parameters of exigency of service, stipulated in Rule 16A of the Army Rules.
23. While dealing with the issue of consideration of the appellant’s claim for onward promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, it is necessary for us to also conclude by observing, that had the claim of the appellant not been duly considered against the vacancy for the post of Lieutenant General, which became available with effect from 1.1.2007, we would have had to hold, that the action was discriminatory. This because, of denial of due consideration to the appellant, who was the senior most eligible serving Major General, as against the claim of others who were junior to him. And specially when, the respondents desired to fill up the said vacancy, and also because, the vacancy had arisen when the appellant still had 14 months of remaining Army service. Surely it cannot be over looked, that the Selection Board had singularly recommended the name of the appellant for promotion, out of a panel of four names. In such an eventuality, we would have no other alternative but to strike down the action of the authorities as being discriminatory and violative of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
24. The deliberations recorded by us hereinabove are incomplete, inasmuch as, we have not answered the pointed objection raised by the learned senior counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2, namely, that an officer is not entitled to promotion during the period of extension in service. For the instant objection raised at the hands of the respondents, it is necessary to refer to the deliberations of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, and specially paragraphs 8 and 9 thereof. A collective reading of the paragraphs 8 and 9 reveals an extremely relevant objective, namely, situations wherein an officer attains the age of retirement without there being a vacancy for his consideration to a higher rank, even though he is eligible for the same. Such an officer who is granted extension in service, cannot claim consideration for promotion, against a vacancy which has become available during the period of his extension in service. The above conclusion drawn by us is clearly apparent from the paragraph 9 of the proceedings of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. In fact in the operative part of the proceedings recorded in paragraph 11, it has been noticed, that .�…extensions motivated by a promotion in the offing during the extension period cannot be allowed…� We can derive only one meaning from the above observations, namely, extension being granted for promotion against a vacancy in the offing. That is to say, retention in service, so as to consider an officer for a vacancy which has not become available prior to his retirement, but is in the offing. The above reason recorded in the operative part of the proceedings of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, is laudible and legal. Insofar as the present controversy is concerned, there is no doubt whatsoever, that a clear vacancy against the rank of Lieutenant General became available with effect from 1.1.2007. At that juncture, the appellant had 14 months of service remaining. It is not as if the vacancy came into existence after the appellant had reached the age of retirement on superannuation. The present case is therefore, not covered by the technical plea canvassed at the hands of the learned senior counsel for the respondents. The denial of promotion to the appellant mainly for the reason, that the appellant was on extension in service, to our mind, is unsustainable besides being arbitrary, specially in the light of the fact, that the vacancy for which the appellant was clamouring consideration, became available, well before the date of his retirement on superannuation. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the basis on which the claim of the appellant for onward promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General was declined, by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet.
25. In view of the fact, that we have found the order of rejection of the appellant’s claim for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, on the ground that he was on extended service to be invalid, we hereby set aside the operative part of the order of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. It is also apparent, that the Selection Board had recommended the promotion of the appellant on the basis of his record of service, past performance, qualities of leadership, as well as, vision, out of a panel of four names. In its deliberations the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, did not record any reason to negate the aforesaid interference, relating to the merit and suitability of the appellant. We are therefore of the view, that the appellant deserves promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, from the date due to him. Ordered accordingly. On account of his promotion to the post of Lieutenant General, the appellant would also be entitled to continuation in service till the age of retirement on superannuation stipulated for Lieutenant Generals, i.e., till his having attained the age of 60 years. As such, the appellant shall be deemed to have been in service against the rank of Lieutenant General till 28.2.2009. Needless to mention, that the appellant would be entitled to all monetary benefits which would have been due to him, on account of his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General till his retirement on superannuation, as also, to revised retiral benefits which would have accrued to him on account of such promotion. The above monetary benefits shall be released to the appellant within three months from the date a certified copy of this order becomes available with the respondents.
26. Allowed in the aforesaid terms.
…………………………..J.
(A.K. Patnaik) 
……..…………………...J.
(Jagdish Singh Khehar) 
New Delhi; January 9, 2014.

Sadashiv Prasad Singh vs Harendar Singh & Ors on 8 January, 1947 Author: J S Khehar Bench: A.K. Patnaik, Jagdish Singh Khehar

Sadashiv Prasad Singh vs Harendar Singh & Ors on 8 January, 1947
Author: J S Khehar
Bench: A.K. Patnaik, Jagdish Singh Khehar
           
                                                                …REPORTABLE...

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  161  OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.23000 of 2010)

Sadashiv Prasad Singh                                    ... Appellant

                                   Versus

Harendar Singh & Ors.                                    … Respondents

                                    WITH

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   162   OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.26550 of 2010)

                               J U D G M E N T
Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.
1. On 11.9.1989, The Allahabad Bank (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Bank’) sanctioned a loan of Rs.12.70 lac to M/s. Amar Timber Works, a partnership firm having three partners, Jagmohan Singh, Payam Shoghi and Dev Kumar Sinha. The above loan was sanctioned to M/s. Amar Timber Works, after its partners had mortgaged certain properties to secure the loan amount. Since the loan amount was not repaid in compliance with the commitment made by M/s. Amar Timber Works, nine years later, in 1998, the Bank preferred Original Application No.107 of 1998 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal for the recovery of the Bank’s dues. The above Original Application was allowed on 21.11.2000. Accordingly, a direction was issued for the recovery of Rs.75,75,564/- from M/s. Amar Timber Works. For the execution of the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, the Bank initiated recovery proceedings on 28.11.2000. During the pendency of the recovery proceedings, Jagmohan Singh, one of the partners of M/s. Amar Timber Works, died (on 27.1.2004). On 16.4.2004, the Recovery Officer attached plot No.722, located at Exhibition Road, P.S. Gandhi Maidan, Patna (hereinafter referred to as ‘the property’) measuring 1298 sq.ft. It would be pertinent to mention that the aforesaid plot was in the ownership of Jagmohan Singh, one of the partners in M/s. Amar Timber Works.
2. On 10.6.2004, Harender Singh, brother of Jagmohan Singh, filed an objection petition before the Recovery Officer alleging, that the attached property did not belong to the judgment debtors, but had been purchased by him from his brother Jagmohan Singh, by executing an agreement of sale dated 10.1.1991, which was duly notarized though not registered. It would be relevant to mention, that Harender Singh pursued the objection petition filed by him before the Recovery Officer till 26.10.2005, but chose to abandon the proceedings thereafter. The order passed by the Recovery officer when the Objector was represented for the last time on 26.10.2005 is being extracted below:
“Ld. Advocate of Bank and objectors appears. Objector reiterated his points and invited attention towards Section 53 of TP Act. Counsel of the bank submits that he had to say nothing more than what was said/submitted earlier. He also submits that D.Drs. was guarantor also in this case hence his properties attached. Put up on 28.12.08 for further hearing.Sd/- Illegible I/C R.O.�
3. The recovery proceedings referred to above remained pending for a further period of more than two years. Finally, the Recovery Officer passed an order dated 5.5.2008, for the sale of the property by way of public auction on 4.7.2008. The Recovery Officer fixed Rs.12.92 lacs as the reserve price, and also fixed 28.8.2008 as the date of its auction. At the auction held on 28.8.2008, Sadashiv Prasad Singh, was the highest bidder. Accordingly, the Recovery Officer ordered the sale of the property in his favour on 28.8.2008. On 22.9.2008, the Recovery Officer, in the absence of any objections, confirmed the sale of the property in favour of Sadashiv Prasad Singh. The Recovery Officer also ordered, the handing over of physical possession of the property to the auction purchaser. Sadashiv Prasad Singh, the auction purchaser, took physical possession of the property on 11.3.2009.
4. In furtherance of the proceedings initiated through Mutation Case No.295/2/09-10, the land in question was mutated in favour of the auction purchaser. It would be relevant to mention that the application for mutation filed by the auction purchaser, Sadashiv Prasad Singh, was supported by letter dated 14.10.2008 of the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Realization Authority, Patna. It would be relevant to mention, that no objections were filed in the mutation case preferred by Sadashiv Prasad Singh, by or on behalf of Harender Singh, before the Mutation Officer.
5. On 27.11.2009, CWJC No.16485 of 2009 was filed by Harender Singh before the High Court of Judicature at Patna (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’). In the aforesaid writ petition, Harender Singh assailed the order of the Recovery Officer dated 5.5.2008, whereby, the property had been ordered to be sold by public auction in discharge of the debt owed by M/s Amar Timber Works to the Allahabad Bank. Vide its order dated 23.3.2010, the High Court ordered the auction purchaser, i.e. Sadashiv Prasad Singh to be impleaded as a party-respondent. On 27.11.2010, the High Court dismissed the above writ petition by accepting the objections raised on behalf of the Bank, as well as, the auction purchaser by holding as under :
“The above facts do weigh with the Court in not interfering with the sale or the proceeding where it has been reached. The petitioner has no satisfactory explanation for not approaching the Court well within time challenging such a decision or the subsequent proceedings or orders of the Recovery Officer at an appropriate time. The conduct of the petitioner by itself has precluded and prevented this Court from passing any order in his favour at this belated stage.
The writ application has not merit. It is dismissed accordingly.�
6. Dissatisfied with the order dated 27.4.2010 whereby the writ petition filed by Harender Singh was dismissed by a Single Bench of the High Court, he preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.844 of 2010. Before the Letters Patent Bench, Harender Singh, brother of Jagmohan Singh, asserted that his brother Jagmohan Singh had availed a loan of Rs.14.70 lacks. As against the aforesaid loan amount, the Bank had initiated proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal for the realization of a sum of 75,75,564/-. The property under reference was sold by way of public auction to Sadashiv Prasad Singh for a sum of Rs.13.20 lacs. As against the aforesaid sale consideration paid by the auction purchaser, Harender Singh, offered a sum of Rs.39 lacs before the Letters Patent Bench. In the order passed by the Letters Patent Bench disposing of Letters Patent Appeal No.844 of 2010, it stands noticed that the Bank had accepted to finally settle the matter on being paid a sum of Rs.45 lacs, subject to the condition that the Harender Singh pays a sum of Rs.15 lacs immediately, and the balance amount of Rs.30 lacs within a period of two years in a phased manner. Even though the learned counsel representing the appellant, Harender Singh was agreeable to proposal of the Bank, the rival parties could not amicably settle the matter. It is, therefore, that the letters patent Bench went on to adjudicate the matter on its merits. The above factual position has been noticed for the reason that it has a nexus to the final order which was eventually passed by the Letters Patent Bench disposing of LPA No.844 of 2010. In fact, it would be in the fitness of matters to extract paragraph 8 from the impugned judgment rendered in LPA No.844 of 2010 in order to appreciate the niceties of the matter. The aforesaid paragraph is, accordingly, being extracted herein :
“8. At this juncture, we may state that the brother of the appellant had availed a loan of Rs.14.70 lacs. The said aspect is not disputed by Mr. Ajay Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the Bank. The Bank had initiated a proceeding before the Tribunal for realization of approximately a sum of Rs.75.75 lacs. The property has been sold for Rs.13.20 lacs. It is submitted by Mr. Ojha that the prices have gone up and he is being offered more than 39 lacs for the same. It is not in dispute that the price, the auction-purchaser has tendered, is Rs.13.20 lacs. On the earlier occasion, a suggestion was given whether the Bank would accept Rs.45 lacs in toto to settle the dispute. Mr. Sinha, learned counsel for the Bank has obtained instructions that the Bank has no objection to settle the same, if the appellant pays Rs.15 lacs immediately so that the same can be paid to the auction-purchaser and Rs.30 lacks should be paid within a period of two years in a phased manner. Mr. Choubey, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is agreeable to pay the same.
Mr. Ojha submitted that he has instructions not to accept the suggestion.�
7. During the course of appellate proceedings, the High Court referred to Chapter V of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the Debt Recoveries Act) and particularly to Section 29 which is being extracted hereunder:
“29. Application of certain provisions of Income-tax Act.—The provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) and the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, as in force from time to time shall, as far as possible, apply with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the amount of debt due under this Act instead of to the Income-tax :
Provided that any reference under the said provisions and the rules to the “assessee� shall be construed as a reference to the defendant under this Act.� The High Court while interpreting Section 29 extracted above, concluded that certain provisions of the Income Tax Act and Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules would be applicable mutatis mutandis in the matter of recovery of debts under the Debt Recoveries Act. The High Court then referred to Rule 11 of the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules and arrived at the conclusion that sub-rule (2) of Rule 11, had not been complied with by the Recovery Officer, inasmuch as, the objection raised by Harender Singh had not been adjudicated upon. As such, the High Court finally concluded that the proceedings before the Recovery Officer were in flagrant violation of the provisions of Rule 11(2) of the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules. Having so concluded, the High Court set aside the proceedings conducted by the Recovery Officer, including the sale of the property by public auction. In order to appreciate the basis of the order passed by the High Court, Rule 11 of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is being extracted herein:
“Investigation by Tax Recovery Officer.
11. (1) Where any claim is preferred to, or any objection is made to the attachment or sale of, any property in execution of a certificate, on the ground that such property is not liable to such attachment or sale, the Tax Recovery Officer shall proceed to investigate the claim or objection:
Provided that no such investigation shall be made where the Tax Recovery Officer considers that the claim or objection was designedly or unnecessarily delayed.
(2) Where the property to which the claim or objection applies has been advertised for sale, the Tax Recovery Officer ordering the sale may postpone it pending the investigation of the claim or objection, upon such terms as to security or otherwise as the Tax Recovery Officer shall deem fit.
(3) The claimant or objector must adduce evidence to show that-
(a) (in the case of immovable property) at the date of the service of the notice issued under this Schedule to pay the arrears, or
(b) (in the case of movable property) at the date of the attachment, he had some interest in, or was possessed of, the property in question.
(4) Where, upon the said investigation, the Tax Recovery Officer is satisfied that, for the reason stated in the claim or objection, such property was not, at the said date, in the possession of the defaulter or of some person in truest for him or in the occupancy of a tenant or other person paying rent to him, or that, being in the possession of the defaulter at the said date, it was so in his possession, not on his own account or as his own property, but on account of or in trust for some other person, or partly on his own account and partly on account of some other person, the Tax Recovery Officer shall make an order releasing the property, wholly or to such extent as he thinks fit, from attachment or sale.
(5) Where the Tax Recovery Officer is satisfied that the property was, at the said date, in the possession of the defaulter as his own property and not on account of any other person, or was in the possession of some other person in trust for him, or in the occupancy of a tenant or other person paying rent to him, the Tax Recovery Officer shall disallow the claim.
(6) Where a claim or an objection is preferred, the party against whom an order is made may institute a suit in a civil court to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute; but, subject to the result of such suit (if any), the order of the Tax Recovery Officer shall be conclusive.�
8. Having dealt with the controversy in the manner expressed in the foregoing paragraphs, the Division Bench of the High Court was of the view that the matter in hand ought to be settled by working out the equities between the parties. Accordingly, the High Court disposed of the matter in the following manner:
“12. Though we have held the same could not have been sold in auction, yet equities are to be worked out. Regard being had to the fact that the respondent-purchaser has deposited Rs.13.20 lac between 28.8.2008 to 22.9.2009 and thus the amount is with the Bank for almost more than one year and 10 months and thereafter there had been challenge to the order in the writ petition and after dismissal of the writ petition the present L.P.A. has been filed in quite promptitude and that the amount of the respondent-purchaser was blocked, it will be obligatory on the part of the appellant to compensate the respondent-purchaser at least by way of payment of interest at the Bank rate. We are disposed to think that if a sum of Rs.17 lacs is paid to the auction-purchaser, it would sub-serve the cause of justice and house of the appellant shall be saved and, accordingly, it is directed that the appellant shall deposit a sum of Rs.17 lacks within a period of four weeks from today in the Bank. After such deposit, the Bank shall hand it over to the purchaser by way of a bank draft. The same shall be sent by registered post with acknowledgment due. Thereafter the appellant shall deposit a further sum of Rs.32 lacs within a period of two years; sum of Rs.16 lacs by 25th March, 2011 and further sum of Rs.16 lacs by 25th March, 2012. Needless to say pro-rate interest shall accrue in favour of the Bank for the said period.
13. After the amount is paid to the purchaser, it would be the duty of the Recovery Officer to hand over the possession to the appellant.�
9. Sadashiv Prasad Singh, the auction purchaser, has assailed the impugned order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in LPA No.844 of 2010 praying for the setting aside of the order by which he has been deprived of the property purchased by him in the public auction held on 28.8.2008, which was subsequently confirmed by the Recovery Officer of the Debt Recovery Tribunal on 23.9.2008. This challenge has been made by Sadashiv Prasad Singh by filing Special Leave Petition (C) No.23000 of 2010. The impugned order passed by the High Court on 17.5.2010, has also been assailed by Harender Singh by preferring Special Leave Petition (C) No.26550 of 2010. The prayer made by Harender Singh is, that order passed by the Division Bench places him in the shoes of the auction purchaser, and as such, he could have only been asked to pay a sum of Rs.17 lacs.
Requiring him to pay a further sum of Rs.32 lacs is unsustainable in law, and accordingly, deserved to be set aside.
10. Leave granted in both the Special Leave Petitions.
11. For the narration of facts, we have relied upon the pleadings and the documents appended to Special Leave Petition (C) No.23000 of 2010.
12. Learned counsel for the auction purchaser Sadashiv Prasad Singh, in the first instance vehemently contended, that in terms of the law declared by this Court, property purchased by a third party auction purchaser, in compliance of a court order, cannot be interfered with on the basis of the success or failure of parties to a proceeding, if auction purchaser had bonafidely purchased the property. In order to substantiate his aforesaid contention, learned counsel representing Sadashiv Prasad Singh placed emphatic reliance, firstly, on a judgment rendered by this Court inAshwin S. Mehta & Anr. vs. Custodian & Ors., (2006) 2 SCC 385). Our attention was drawn to the following observations recorded therein :
“In that view of the matter, evidently, creation of any third-party interest is no longer in dispute nor the same is subject to any order of this Court. In any event, ordinarily, a bona fide purchaser for value in an auction-sale is treated differently than a decree-holder purchasing such properties. In the former event, even if such a decree is set aside, the interest of the bona fide purchaser in an auction-sale is saved. (See Nawab Zain-ul-Abdin Khan v. Mohd. Asghar Ali Khan (1887) 15 IA 12) The said decision has been affirmed by this Court in Gurjoginder Singh v. Jaswant Kaur (1994) 2 SCC 368).â€� (emphasis is ours) On the same subject, and to the same end, learned counsel placed reliance on another judgment rendered by this Court in Janatha Textiles & Ors. vs. Tax Recovery Officer & Anr., (2008) 12 SCC 582, wherein the conclusions drawn in Ashwin S. Mehta’s case (supra) came to be reiterated. In the above judgment, this Court relied upon the decisions of the Privy Council and of this Court in Nawab Zain-Ul-Abdin Khan v. Mohd. Asghar Ali Khan, (1887-88) 15 IA 12;Janak Raj vs. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1967 SC 608;
Gurjoginder Singh vs. Jaswant Kaur, (1994) 2 SCC 368; Padanathil Ruqmini Amma vs. P.K. Abdulla, (1996) 7 SCC 668, as also, on Ashwin S. Mehta (supra) in order to conclude, that it is an established principle of law, that a third party auction purchaser’s interest, in the auctioned property continues to be protected, notwithstanding that the underlying decree is subsequently set aside or otherwise. It is, therefore, that this Court in its ultimate analysis observed as under:
“20. Law makes a clear distinction between a stranger who is a bona fide purchaser of the property at an auction-sale and a decree-holder purchaser at a court auction. The strangers to the decree are afforded protection by the court because they are not connected with the decree. Unless the protection is extended to them the court sales would not fetch market value or fair price of the property.� (emphasis is ours) On the issue as has been dealt with in the foregoing paragraph, this Court has carved out one exception. The aforesaid exception came to be recorded in Velji Khimji and Company vs. Official Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro Product (Gujarat) Limited & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 299, wherein it was held as under :
“30. In the first case mentioned above i.e. where the auction is not subject to confirmation by any authority, the auction is complete on the fall of the hammer, and certain rights accrue in favour of the auction-purchaser. However, where the auction is subject to subsequent confirmation by some authority (under a statute or terms of the auction) the auction is not complete and no rights accrue until the sale is confirmed by the said authority. Once, however, the sale is confirmed by that authority, certain rights accrue in favour of the auction-purchaser, and these rights cannot be extinguished except in exceptional cases such as fraud.
31. In the present case, the auction having been confirmed on 30.7.2003 by the Court it cannot be set aside unless some fraud or collusion has been proved. We are satisfied that no fraud or collusion has been established by anyone in this case.� (emphasis is ours) It is, therefore, apparent that the rights of an auction-purchaser in the property purchased by him cannot be extinguished except in cases where the said purchase can be assailed on grounds of fraud or collusion.
13. It is imperative for us, to adjudicate upon the veracity of the sale of the property by way of public auction, made in favour of Sadashiv Prasad Singh on 28.8.2008. It is not a matter of dispute, that the lis in the present controversy was between the Allahabad Bank on the one hand and the partners of M/s. Amar Timber Works, namely, Jagmohan Singh, Payam Shoghi and Dev Kumar Sinha on the other. Sadashiv Prasad Sinha was not a party to the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal or before the Recovery Officer. By an order dated 5.5.2008, the Recovery Officer ordered the sale of the property by way of public auction. On 4.7.2008, the Recovery Officer fixed Rs.12.92 lacs as the reserve price, and also fixed 28.8.2008 as the date of auction. At the public auction held on 28.8.2008, Sadashiv Prasad Sinha was the highest bidder, and accordingly, the Recovery officer ordered the sale of the property in his favour on 28.8.2008. In the absence of any objections, the Recovery Officer confirmed the sale of the property in favour of Sadashiv Prasad Sinha on 22.9.2008. Thereafter possession of the property was also handed over to the auction-purchaser on 11.3.2009. Applying the law declared by this Court in the judgments referred in the foregoing paragraphs irrespective of the merits of the lis between the rival parties, namely, the Allahabad Bank and the partners of M/s. Amar Timber Works, it is not open for anyone to assail the purchase of the property made by Sadashiv Prasad Sinha in the public auction held in furtherance of the order passed by the Recovery Officer on 28.8.2008. In the above view of the matter, especially in the absence of any allegation of fraud or collusion, we are of the view that the High Court clearly erred while setting aside the auction ordered in favour of the auction-purchaser, Sadashiv Prasad Sinha in the impugned order dated 17.5.2010.
14. A perusal of the impugned order especially paragraphs 8, 12 and 13 extracted hereinabove reveal that the impugned order came to be passed in order to work out the equities between the parties. The entire deliberation at the hands of the High Court were based on offers and counter offers, inter se between the Allahabad Bank on the one hand and the objector Harender Singh on the other, whereas the rights of Sadashiv Prasad Sinha – the auction-purchaser, were not at all taken into consideration. As a matter of fact, it is Sadashiv Prasad Sinha who was to be deprived of the property which came to be vested in him as far back as on 28.8.2008. It is nobody’s case, that at the time of the auction-purchase, the value of the property purchased by Sadashiv Prasad Sinha was in excess of his bid. In fact, the factual position depicted under paragraph 8 of the impugned judgment reveals, that the escalation of prices had taken place thereafter, and the value of the property purchased by Sadashiv Prasad Sinha was presently much higher than the bid amount. Since it was nobody’s case that Sadashiv Prasad Sinha, the highest bidder at the auction conducted on 28.8.2008, had purchased the property in question at a price lesser than the then prevailing market price, there was no justification whatsoever to set aside the auction-purchase made by him on account of escalation of prices thereafter. The High Court in ignoring the vested right of the appellant in the property in question, after his auction bid was accepted and confirmed, subjected him to grave injustice by depriving him to property which he had genuinely and legitimately purchased at a public auction. In our considered view, not only did the Division Bench of the High Court in the matter by ignoring the sound, legal and clear principles laid down by this Court in respect of a third party auction purchaser, the High Court also clearly overlooked the equitable rights vested in the auction-purchaser during the pendency of a lis. The High Court also clearly overlooked the equitable rights vested in the auction purchaser while disposing of the matter.
15. At the time of hearing, we were thinking of remanding the matter to the Recovery Officer to investigate into the objection of Harender Singh under Rule 11 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961. But considering the delay such a remand may cause, we have ourselves examined the objections of Harender Singh and reject the objections for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the contention raised at the hands of the respondents before the High Court, that the facts narrated by Harender Singh (the appellant in Special Leave Petition (C) No.26550 of 2010) were a total sham, as he was actually the brother of one of the judgment-debtors, namely, Jagmohan Singh. And that Harender Singh had created an unbelievable story with the connivance and help of his brother, so as to save the property in question. The claim of Harender Singh in his objection petition, was based on an unregistered agreement to sell dated 10.1.1991. Not only that such an agreement to sell would not vest any legal right in his favour; it is apparent that it may not have been difficult for him to have had the aforesaid agreement to sell notarized in connivance with his brother, for the purpose sought to be achieved. Secondly, it is apparent from the factual position depicted in the foregoing paragraphs that Harender Singh, despite his having filed objections before the Recovery Officer, had abandoned the contest raised by him by not appearing (and by not being represented) before the Recovery Officer after 26.10.2005, whereas, the Recovery Officer had passed the order of sale of the property by way of public auction more than two years thereafter, only on 5.5.2008. Having abandoned his claim before the Recovery Officer, it was not open to him to have reagitated the same by filing a writ petition before the High Court. Thirdly, a remedy of appeal was available to Harender Singh in respect of the order of the Recovery Officer assailed by him before the High Court under Section 30, which is being extracted herein to assail the order dated 5.5.2008:
“30. Appeal against the order of Recovery Officer.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 29, any person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer made under this Act may, within thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order is issued to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal.
(2) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Tribunal may, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard, and after making such inquiry as it deems fit, confirm, modify or set aside the order made by the Recovery Officer in exercise of his powers under section 25 to 28 (both inclusive).� The High Court ought not to have interfered with in the matter agitated by Harender Singh in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In fact, the learned Single Judge rightfully dismissed the writ petition filed by Harender Singh. Fourthly, Harender Singh could not be allowed to raise a challenge to the public auction held on 28.8.2008 because he had not raised any objection to the attachment of the property in question or the proclamations and notices issued in newspapers in connection with the auction thereof. All these facts cumulatively lead to the conclusion that after 26.10.2005, Harender Singh had lost all interest in the property in question and had therefore, remained a silent spectator to various orders which came to be passed from time to time. He had, therefore, no equitable right in his favour to assail the auction-purchase made by Sadashiv Prasad Sinha on 28.8.2008. Finally, the public auction under reference was held on 28.8.2008. Thereafter the same was confirmed on 22.09.2008. Possession of the property was handed over to the auction-purchaser Sadashiv Prasad Sinha on 11.3.2009. The auction-purchaser initiated mutation proceedings in respect of the property in question. Harender Singh did not raise any objections in the said mutation proceedings. The said mutation proceedings were also finalized in favour of Sadashiv Prasad Sinha. Harender Singh approached the High Court through CWJC No.16485 of 209 only on 27.11.2009. We are of the view that the challenged raised by Harender Singh ought to have been rejected on the grounds of delay and latches, especially because third party rights had emerged in the meantime. More so, because the auction purchaser was a bona fide purchaser for consideration, having purchased the property in furtherance of a duly publicized public auction, interference by the High Court even on ground of equity was clearly uncalled for.
For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we are of the view that the impugned order dated 17.5.2010 passed by the High Court allowing Letters Patent Appeal No.844 of 2010 deserves to be set aside. The same is accordingly set aside. The right of the appellant Sadashiv Prasad Sinha in Plot No.2722, Exhibition Road, P.S. Gandhi Maidan, Patna, measuring 1289 sq.ft. is hereby confirmed. In the above view of the matter, while the appeal preferred by Sadashiv Prasad Sinha stands allowed, the one filed by Harender Singh is hereby dismissed.
……………………………....J.
(A.K. Patnaik)

………………..……………..J.
(Jagdish Singh Khehar) New Delhi;
January 8, 2014

Krishna Kanta Majhi & Ors vs State Of W.B & Ors on 7 January, 1947 Author: K Radhakrishnan Bench: K.S. Radhakrishnan, C. Nagappan

Krishna Kanta Majhi & Ors vs State Of W.B & Ors on 7 January, 1947
Author: K Radhakrishnan
Bench: K.S. Radhakrishnan, C. Nagappan
                                                                         NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION


               SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.27126 OF 2013



Krishna Kanta Majhi & Ors.              ...¦. Petitioners

                                   Versus

State of West Bengal and others         ….¦. Respondents



                                  O R D E R
K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
We may point out that when the matter camp up for hearing on 03.12.2013, we were not inclined to disturb the admissions made in favour of the respondents, and passed an order on the said date directing the State of West Bengal to ascertain whether the seats are available so that the petitioners could be accommodated in the subject of their choice, without disturbing the admissions already made to the respondents.
We are informed by the State counsel that it would not be possible to accommodate the petitioners, especially, in the subject of their choice, without disturbing the admissions already made to the respondents. In such circumstances, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed accordingly.
……………………………..J.
(K.S. Radhakrishnan)

…………………………..¦.J.
(C. Nagappan)

New Delhi, January 07, 2014.